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1. Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) as a market instrument to incentivize private 
investment in renewable energy 
 
Science has provided increasing evidence that, if we are to avoid dangerous climate change, we must 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions urgently and on an unprecedented scale. The energy sector has a 
key role to play in this endeavour. In its World Energy Outlook 2012, the International Energy Agency 
warns that, by 2017, a continuation of current trends in energy infrastructure investment will lock in 
all CO2 emissions permissible if a rise in temperature of more than 2°C is to be avoided.  
Renewable energies, addressing the supply side, and energy efficiency technologies, addressing the 
demand side, are among the most important solutions to achieve a transition to sustainability. In 
recent years, renewable energies have seen impressive growth rates regarding capacity and 
investment. However, although their cost structure compared to fossil fuel alternatives is improving, 
most still need additional support to be economically viable.  
Several political instruments have been used to support renewable energies, such as quotas, tax 
instruments and feed-in tariffs (FiTs). The latter have shown to be particularly successful, and have 
seen increasing implementation in developing and industrialised countries alike, see Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Number of countries with renewable energy support policies 
 
Sources: REN21 (2013), REN21 (2014) 
Note: The difference between predetermined and tendered FiTs will be explained in Section 2a. 
 
Feed-in tariffs are designed as a preferential price to be paid to the electricity generator per kilowatt 
hour of generated renewable energy. This price is usually higher than the regular market price for 
electricity, to cover higher technology costs and risk. Determining a FiT which is high enough to 
attract investment (that is, to be effective) and low enough to avoid windfall profits (that is, to be 
efficient) can be a challenging task, and the introduction of effective and efficient FiTs can be subject 
to intense lobbying. Players in the renewable energy sector are obvious actors, but other players 
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Policy makers need to navigate and manage these partly conflicting interests while also bearing in 
mind personal or their political party’s interests.  
This report aims to discuss two methods of FiT determination, predetermining and tendering FiTs, by 
highlighting the political economy dynamic in their implementation and comparing their advantages 
and disadvantages in the policy process.  
The remainder of the report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 starts by introducing the technicalities of 
FiT determination and development over time in more detail. This lays the ground for closer analysis 
of political economy dynamics in renewable energy support (Chapter 3), including the discussion of 
policy evolution in two countries, Germany and South Africa. Chapter 4 concludes by contrasting 
both determination methods with the aim of providing policy makers with guidance on key questions 
to ask when preparing the decision for a suitable method of FiT determination.  
 
2. The technicalities of FiTs 
a. Basic FiT design options 
 
There are two general approaches of FiT determination. They are similar in that they provide a 
financial reward for every unit of renewable electricity produced but differ in the way the tariffs are 
determined.  
• Predetermined feed-in tariffs are defined as ‘[g]eneration-based payment for electricity, 
predetermined by policymakers and constantly available to project developers’ (Becker and 
Fischer 2012: 2).  
• Tendered feed-in tariffs are described as ‘[g]eneration-based payment for electricity, 
determined and allocated through tenders in which project developers compete’ (Becker and 
Fischer 2012: 2).   
 
b. Predetermining FiTs  
 
When predetermining feed-in tariffs, governments set technology-specific tariff rates which allow 
project developers to recover their costs and a reasonable return on their investment. The rates are 
guaranteed for a certain period (in most schemes, 10-20 years), and project developers gain 
guaranteed access to the electricity grid.  
With this long-term, stable investment framework, feed-in tariffs are among the most widespread 
and effective support measures today (GIZ 2012, Marques and Fuinhas 2012). Many countries, 
mostly in the OECD, have experienced the effectiveness of feed-in tariffs. Guaranteeing reasonable 
profits over a long-term planning horizon, these schemes can act as a major stimulus for renewable 
electricity generation growth (Haselip 2011). Predetermining the FiT rate provides a maximum of 
certainty to investors, and, if the rates are attractive enough, a maximum of investment incentive. 
This can be necessary if otherwise risk would be deemed to high (e.g. when technologies are still very 
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immature) or profits too low (e.g. when technologies are expensive). The German FiTs demonstrated 
the potential effectiveness of FiTs even when technologies are at an early stage, as was the case for 
solar PV in the early 2000s. The learning curve unlocked by this policy showed considerable success 
and substantially lowered the cost of renewable energies. 
Predetermining FiTs can, however, also lead to windfall profits. The efficiency thus very much 
depends on the correct determination of tariff rates. They must be high enough to stimulate 
investment, but should not lead to excessive rents. Rent-seeking must be checked by the careful 
adjustment of the initial tariffs to actual project costs, and by the flexibility of the instrument to react 
to cost developments. This efficient design of tariff rates is indeed very complex. It is further 
complicated by the fact that most policy-makers, unlike actors in the energy market, are not experts 
in the technologies and markets they are called on to regulate. The demands on the embedded 
autonomy and meritocracy of policy-makers are thus very high.  
Some of the challenge of determining initial FiT rates can be avoided if the support scheme enables 
later adjustments to be made. Rates must be flexible enough to allow for unforeseen developments 
in project costs, such as the sharp fall in the prices of solar photovoltaic panels in 2010. This will also 
preserve incentives to innovate and to reduce costs. However, the adjustments need to be 
predictable so that investment security may be ensured. Automatic adjustment formulae applicable 
only to new projects may mitigate policy risks for investors. Policy changes which adversely affect 
projects that have already reached financial close may, however, result in a serious loss of investors’ 
trust (Hille et al. 2013). The costs governments can save through such changes in the short term may 
be outweighed by added risk premiums in the longer term (Rathmann et al. 2011), which may even 
spill over to other policy areas. The government of Spain, for example, approved retroactive cuts in 
feed-in tariff levels in early 2013 (ANPIER 2013, Coats 2013). This provoked considerable protest and 
even threats of legal action by renewable energy companies and associations (ANPIER 2013). These 
companies had already suffered as a result of hasty changes to a (generous) tariff of 44 c/kWh in 
2007, which was reduced incrementally to 12.5 c/kWh in 2011 and abolished altogether in 2012. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the high initial rate caused the energy sector’s deficit to rise 
steadily to about USD 38 billion in 2013 (González and Rucinski 2013). This, combined with the large 
government deficit, made it clear that the rate could not be maintained at anything like its initial high 
level. Despite the reduced support, however, Spanish solar photovoltaic installations still seem to be 
attractive to investors, investment having continued on a smaller scale (ANPIER 2013).  
 
c. Auctioning FiTs 
 
Tendering, on the other hand, helps policy-makers to determine the efficient level of support by 
means of a competitive process, thus reducing dependence on biased information. It can be very 
helpful in correcting information asymmetries between renewable energy project developers and 
policy-makers by forcing the former to disclose information on the costs associated with planned 
projects (Azuela and Barroso 2012).  
Tendering entails the creation of one or more bidding windows for project developers to bid for the 
preferential tariff they need to realize their projects. Several bidding rounds allow for systematic 
policy learning, which is particularly important when policy instruments are new and/or the 
7 
 
implementing government needs to build technical experience. Although several bidding rounds can 
entail the risk of collusion, experience has shown gradually decreasing FiT rates when several bidding 
rounds were offered (for example in India and South Africa). 
Current tenders are designed to prioritise investment at least cost locations, thereby favouring sites 
with favourable resource conditions. They do not take into account that the localisation of renewable 
energy sources can have effects on the stability of the grid, and that their proximity to substations or 
centres of demand impacts on their benefit to the general energy system. They thus do not 
incentivise the localisation of renewable energy generation at particularly beneficial sites. 
Tenders for renewable energy support have resulted in relatively low bids in several countries, such 
as Peru, China and India (Becker and Fischer 2013, Altenburg et al. 2014). If the number of bidders is 
sufficiently high, the risk of excessive rents will be reduced significantly. However, while it reduces 
the risk to the government, tendering increases it for project developers: they have to invest in 
project proposals without knowing whether they will be able to secure support. This reduces their 
willingness to invest in site selection, which may have an adverse effect on generation once the 
project has been realized and increases the risk premium they include in their tariff bids. 
Furthermore, when project developers are inexperienced or technologies are immature, there is a 
risk of the developers underestimating the costs and failing to deliver on the projects (GIZ 2012). This 
can act as a major obstacle to the effectiveness of tender-based support, as happened in the United 
Kingdom in the 1990s and in China in 2008 (Kreycik et al. 2011, Batlle et al. 2012).  
Tendering may nevertheless prove to be the more feasible option for renewable electricity support 
particularly when policy-makers have little experience of designing appropriate feed-in tariffs. The 
risk of unfeasibly low bids can be minimized by a number of additional measures, such as those 
included in India’s solar photovoltaic support (Altenburg et al. 2014). To be eligible for the bidding 
process, project developers must comply with technical and financial qualification criteria and furnish 
bid bonds, which rise as the level of bids falls (Government of India 2011).  
Combining tendering and fixed feed-in tariffs in a sequence can be an option that enables the 
benefits of both instruments to be reaped while mitigating the risks they entail. Governments can 
use tenders to elicit information on appropriate tariff rates and use this information to establish a 
system of fixed feed-in tariffs that lower risk premiums. China, for example, has experimented with a 
strategy of ‘prior tendering’ when determining its feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy (Kreycik et 
al. 2011, Becker and Fischer 2013). However, tendering is a complex process and the involved 
transaction costs may be too high when financial resources and human capacities are scarce. 
Whichever way of determining FiTs a government uses, it needs to organise political support for the 
implementation of its renewable energy policy. A sound knowledge of facts and arguments, but also 





3. Political economy of FiTs  
a. Collecting arguments to forge coalitions and mitigate 
opposition 
 
Given the cost decrease many renewable energy technologies have seen in the past years, cost-
effectiveness is a sound argument in favour of renewable energy deployment. This can be 
complemented by stressing other co-benefits. Particularly in countries with narrow electricity reserve 
margins, renewables can contribute to stabilisation of supply by fast installation of new capacity, and 
cater for quickly growing demand. When countries import a large share of their electricity, they can 
contribute to energy independence. Moreover, (small) decentralized power plants can help 
electrifying rural and remote areas which are not yet connected to the grid, a factor which may be 
important especially to developing countries. Newly created renewables industries can contribute to 
job creation and tax revenue generation, and, depending on technology and resource endowment, 
renewables can simply be the cheapest available option.  
As Heising et al. (2014) point out, the identification of such co-benefits requires sober assessment of 
variable renewables potentials and fit with the national energy system, rather than political 
arguments which have often been the basis of past renewable energy planning. An integrated energy 
planning approach needs to consider existing capacities, resource potentials and demand patterns to 
adequately answer the questions of timing, localisation, type and amount of renewable energy 
capacity to be built. Renewable energy technologies differ in their specific advantages, and energy 
planning needs to consider these specificities. Solar photovoltaics, for example, have very short 
project realisation times (less than a year from plan to operation is possible), while wind energy, 
given good resource conditions, is among the cheapest renewable energy technologies (Heising et al. 
2014). Once a sound and diligent analysis has been conducted, the arguments can be used to forge 
coalitions and mitigate opposition. In this process, cooperation with central actors in the energy 
sector and strategy communication play important roles.  
 
b. Central actors in the electricity sector 
 
To analyse the political economy of a transformation process, it is necessary to get an overview of 
main actors, their interests, and possibilities of taking influence. The direction and strength of actors’ 
influences need to be assessed, and, where they conflict with policy aims, managed by government. 
The distribution of power and interests between actors will influence the likelihood of renewable 
energy support implementation and its design.  
The traditional electricity sector tends towards natural monopolies, achieving the lowest long-run 
average cost when production is permanently concentrated in a single or few enterprises. This 
originates from the necessity of high ex ante investments particularly in grid infrastructure, but also 
in large scale generation (Scott and Seth 2013). The subsequent concentration of assets and 




While main actors in the electricity sector differ between countries, there are similar patterns, see 
Figure 2.  
 




Source: Author’s own 
* IPPs = independent power producers 
 
While actor and power constellations and the localization of expertise differ between countries and 
this depiction can only be schematic, it aims to uncover main actors and the typical character and 
strength of their influence. Red boxes indicate typical main actors, with bold arrows indicating strong 
influence. Actors outside the narrowly defined energy system, such as other political parties, are not 
depicted. Schmid et al. (2015) elaborate on the German case to provide a more detailed picture of 
the numerous actors involved in a transition to sustainable energy. 
The ministry in charge of energy can be a ministry concerned only with energy issues, but energy 
issues can also be located in a ministry which is also concerned with other issues. The choice of 
ministry where energy issues are located and the power of this ministry within government will 
impact on the aims of energy policy making, and may already indicate a direction of the country’s 
energy strategies and planning. The localization of renewable energy issues in a powerful ministry 
may strengthen their case, but also water down priorities in favour of other interests. A separate 
ministry for renewable energy may indicate a high priority of the issue within government, but if said 




Depending on capacities of the ministry in question, energy strategy making is more or less 
dependent on industry and advisor expertise. This may impact on the influence certain lobby groups 
can take on energy policy making. Incumbent electricity generators and large consumers are often 
particularly well placed to provide expertise and to organize in powerful groups which effectively 
exert pressure on governments to shape policy frameworks in their favour. A growing renewable 
energy industry can counterbalance this influence, and provide expertise in such issues as grid 
integration and spacial planning of intermittent generation sources. Otherwise, the interests of 
incumbent electricity generators are often focused on fossil fuel based, centralised electricity supply. 
This has been the mode of generation for the past decades in most countries, and incumbents are 
often heavily invested in related capacities, equipment and infrastructure. In countries with strong 
demand growth, such as most emerging countries, the conflicts of interests between incumbent 
electricity providers and newcomers are mitigated. However, this also means that the introduction of 
renewable energy simply adds capacity to the incumbent system, instead of leading to a systems 
transition towards sustainability (Baker et al. 2014). This situation differs from most OECD markets, 
where a growing renewable energy industry tends to crowd incumbents out (Heising et al. 2014).  
Large industrial consumers of electricity are usually interested in reliable and cheap electricity 
supply. This may work in favour of renewable energies once they become cost-competitive with or 
cheaper than fossil fuel alternatives, and when grid integration, localisation and supply/demand 
management or storage issues are addressed at scale. Stable electricity supply may also be an 
argument in favour of renewables where generation reserve margins of incumbent generators are 
narrow and brown or black outs frequent. Where electricity generation from coal is the cheapest 
option, and renewables support is financed by higher electricity prices, energy intensive industries 
are likely to oppose larger shares of renewables in the mix. 
Households play an indirect role in renewable energy policy making as consumers of electricity, as 
voters, and in some countries as small scale producers of renewable electricity (e.g. solar home 
systems). Their interests depend on preferences for low cost electricity, environmental protection or 
other policy aims. These preferences can, for example, be identified by household surveys.  
FiT Schemes usually include a surcharge paid by end consumers and tend to increase the price for 
electricity. In political situations where the price of electricity is politically sensitive this can be a 
barrier to FiTs. The burden on poor households and the fair distribution of additional costs need to 
be considered with particular care. The global prevalence of fuel and electricity subsidies shows that 
energy prices can indeed be a political issue. Governments thus need to ensure that renewable 
energy support policies, while being effective, are also cost-efficient. Both effectiveness and 
efficiency are strongly influenced by the determination of initial FiT rates, but also by the flexibility of 
FiT rates in the policy process. 
 
c.  Country experience: Germany 
 
Renewable energy policy in Germany is integrated in the broader framework of the ‘Energiewende’ 
(energy transition). The responsibility for this national transformation project is mainly located in the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), which is a comparatively influential 
ministry. This localisation may strengthen the case of renewable energies, but also water down 
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priorities in favour of economic interests. Other ministries are responsible for related issues, such as 
climate change goals, which are located in the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB). For an overview of responsibilities, see Table 1.  
 
The introduction of renewable electricity in the context of the Energiewende has brought about 
winners and losers. In their 2015 study on ‘Deep Decarbonization in Germany’ Kemfert et al. (2015) 
highlight the following distributive effects: 
• Incumbent electricity generators lose market shares and profit margins. 
Two trends have been impacting the four prominent enterprises on the German electricity 
market, E.On, Vattenfall, RWE and EnBW. First, the German electricity market was liberalised 
in 1998 to allow for more competition and to lower market concentration. While the four 
firms shared 84 percent of conventional electricity generation in 2010, their added market 
share in 2013 amounted to 74 percent. Second, the growth in electricity generation from 
renewable sources has led to a further reduction of incumbents market power and electricity 
spot market prices, see Figure 3. Profit margins of existing generation capacities have 
decreased, leading to strategy changes of the generators, such as a reorganisation of E.On 
which spun off its fossil fuel based generation to concentrate on renewable energies and 
energy services. 
• Large industrial consumers benefit from surcharge exemptions and the merit order effect. 
Energy intensive industries have successfully lobbied the German government for 
exemptions from the renewable electricity surcharge. While the industrial sector accounts 
for almost 50 per cent of German electricity consumption, it has to bear only 30 per cent of 
the surcharge. Private households with an electricity consumption share of roughly one 
quarter have to bear 35 per cent of the surcharge (Lütkenhorst and Pegels 2014). In addition, 
industry benefits from the electricity price decreases caused by increasing amounts of 
renewable electricity fed into the grid (‘merit order effect’). The annual benefits from this 
effect amount to about 500 million EUR (Kemfert et al. 2015). 
Table 1: Overview of ‘Energiewende’ responsibilities 
Source: Sopher (2014) based on Kemfert and Horne (2013) 
Federal Ministry Responsibilities 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy Reliable supply of energy, energy efficiency, 
energy grid 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety 
Implementation and achievement of climate 
goals and policies, e.g. emissions trading 
compliance and jurisdiction over energy 
efficiency goals and measures 
Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital 
Infrastructure 
Energy efficiency in infrastructure and low 
carbon transportation 
Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency Authorization of offshore wind parks 
Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture Bioenergy consumer protection 
Federal Ministry of Finance Energy taxation and control of KfW bank, which 




• Households and small and medium enterprises pay the additional cost of the 
Energiewende. 
In 2013 the electricity surcharge – that is to say, the rise in electricity price attributable to the 
FiTs – for consumers who did not benefit from exemptions amounted to 5.3 ct/kWh, rising to 
6.24 ct/kWh in 2014 (Lütkenhorst and Pegels 2014, Kemfert et al. 2015). The additional 
burden on households and small and medium enterprises due to surcharge exemptions for 
the largest electricity consuming companies call the equity of the current support system 
into question and have led to intense discussions (Pegels and Lütkenhorst 2014). 
Nonetheless, the support of the population for the Energiewende as such continues to be 
high.  
• Renewable electricity producers and municipalities benefit from renewable electricity 
generation growth.  
German renewable energy policy has deliberately placed a premium on creating a broad 
foundation for various renewable energy technologies to develop and become commercially 
viable. However, this premium seems to have led to a bubble in the German solar PV 
manufacturing industry. Obviously, the critical challenge is to identify a sufficiently high 
incentive (subsidy) level for investments to be triggered without creating excessively high 
rents in terms of windfall profits. This presupposes correct assumptions about future 
technological learning curves and price trends as a basis for making well-informed decisions 
about an optimal tariff degression scale. The assumptions in the case of solar PV did not 
correspond with the considerable cost reductions of PV installations since 2009 
(Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft 2013).  
Municipalities were able to benefit from the growing number of renewable energy 
cooperatives, both in terms of employment generation and tax revenues. According to 
calculations by Heinbach et al. (2014), the renewable energy sector added a total of 9.3 






Figure 3: Wholesale electricity spot market prices in Germany (in blue, trend in black, EUR / MWh, 
left axis) against renewable electricity generation (in red, TWh, right axis) 
 
 
Source: based on BMWi (2015b), BMWi (2015a). 
 
d. Country experience: South Africa 
 
The responsibility for South African renewable energy policy is officially located in the Department of 
Energy, which was created after the split of the former South African Department of Minerals and 
Energy. This separation of the ministry into a Department of Mineral Resources and a Department of 
Energy created an opportunity space for moving away from coal and supporting renewable energies 
(Morris and Martin 2015). However, a second factor was required: renewable energy policy making 
was strongly supported by the South African National Treasury. In fact, a unit staffed by the Treasury 
but located at the Department of Energy was key to drafting and implementing the Renewable 
Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme as the centrepiece of South African 
renewable energy policy (Morris and Martin 2015: 8).   
Renewable energy policy making is embedded in the broader national energy planning, which is laid 
out in the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP). The IRP is intended to be a living document to plan the 
specific amounts of generation capacity to be added in the coming twenty years. While there are 
public stakeholder hearings in the genesis and development of this document, lobby groups seem to 
have preferential access to the process. The current IRP version, which dates back to 2010 with an 
update in 2013, was influenced by a ‘technical advisory group’ which consisted of representatives of 
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Eskom and government (Baker et al. 2014: 802). While substantive amounts of renewable energy 
capacity were included in the IRP, the dominance of coal in the South African electricity mix is 
unchallenged.  
Similar to the German case, there are gains and losses from South African renewable energy support 
policy. However, in this case the distribution of gains and losses is less clear than in the German case. 
• The monopoly position of the incumbent electricity generator Eskom is weakened, but 
pressure to close the electricity generation gap is lessened, too.  
With the introduction of independent renewable power producers in the South African 
energy sector, Eskom loses some of its monopoly power. The successful tendering of 
renewable capacity is now serving as a role model to also tender fossil fuel based capacity 
(Greve 2015, Paton 2015). However, Eskom’s dominant position in the sector remains largely 
untouched. Given Eskom’s dire financial situation, the delays in the construction of two 
major new coal fired power stations (Medupi and Kusile), and the narrow electricity reserve 
margin, the pressure on Eskom to provide stable electricity supply for the country is 
considerable. This pressure can be somewhat lessened by the quick addition of renewable 
energy to the national capacity.  
• Large industrial consumers, in particular the members of the energy intensive users group, 
benefit from more stable electricity supply, but suffer from electricity price increases. 
South Africa has been experiencing frequent brown outs in the course of its electricity crisis, 
and quickly scalable renewable energies contribute to easing the generation constraints. 
Where electricity generation from coal is the cheapest option, and renewables support is 
financed by higher electricity prices, energy intensive industries are likely to oppose larger 
shares of renewables in the mix. While South African wind power has been competitive with 
electricity generation from coal since bidding round 2, solar photovoltaics are still more 
expensive, despite strong cost reductions (Paton 2015). Since 2011, bids for wind energy 
tariffs have decreased by 55 per cent, and for solar photovoltaic by 76 per cent. 
• Renewable energy component producers and their employees may be able to benefit from 
domestic content rules. 
In the bidding rounds for renewable energy capacity, the South African government included 
local content requirements for wind power of 25 per cent in the first procurement round 
(2012-2013), and 40 per cent in the second round (2013-2014), to be raised to 60 per cent in 
future. This did not seem to discourage foreign investors, who account for most investments 
(OECD 2015, Paton 2015). With rising requirements, however, more equipment will need to 
be produced in South Africa, which may attract foreign investments in manufacturing 
capacity, for example of wind towers or turbine blades.  
• Renewable energy independent power producers benefit from a newly created market. 
Without the supportive policy, there would hardly be any renewable energy projects in South 
Africa. Capacity stagnated at very low numbers until the first renewable energy bidding 
window. The domestic content rules included in the South African policy may in future raise 
the cost of renewable projects, since project developers cannot source from the cheapest 
internationally available component suppliers. 
• Households have a preference for renewable energies, but only if electricity is cheap and 
supply is stable.  
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South African households play an indirect role in renewable energy policy making as 
consumers of electricity and as voters. Their interests can, for example, be identified by 
household surveys, such as conducted by the South African Department of Energy (see Figure 
4). This survey shows that households have a strong preference for electricity prices to be 
low and affordable, and for electricity supply to be stable. 49 per cent of respondents to the 
South African Social Attitudes Survey 2012 opined that protesting about the price of 
electricity was ‘Not wrong at all’, and a further 20 per cent were of the opinion that it is 
‘Wrong only sometimes’ (Department of Energy 2013). Moreover, the findings indicate that 
households have a growing preference for renewable energies. Altogether, this indicates that 
electricity prices are a highly political issue and that the South African government needs to 
ensure that its renewable energy support policy, while being effective, is also efficient. At the 
same time, it needs to communicate that renewable energy support has not been 
responsible for the stark electricity price increases of past years. Instead, a lack of 
maintenance investment and the high upfront cost of necessary new infrastructure have led 
to the recent price hikes. 
Figure 4: Household preferences for government priorities in electricity supply (in percent), 




Source: Department of Energy (2013) 















Feed-in tariffs (FiTs) are among the most widely used and effective renewable energy support 
policies globally. When introducing FiTs, governments have the options of predetermining the FiT 
rates or tendering them. Both options have advantages and disadvantages in terms of their required 
management capabilities, adaptability to technology cost developments etc. Both options also have 
implications on the distribution of risk and profit opportunities (or cost) between project developers 
and electricity consumers. Furthermore, other actors, such as incumbent power producers and 
energy intensive companies have stakes in the electricity sector. Obviously, this implies a risk of 
lobbying and political capture. Governments thus need to cater for political economy considerations, 
that is, they need to consider actor and interest constellations and forge coalitions for policy 
implementation. Evidence on co-benefits of renewable energies, such as the fast addition of 
generation capacity in situations of quickly growing demand, enhanced energy independence when 
countries import a large share of their electricity, and cost-competitiveness, depending on a 
country’s technology and resource endowment, can serve as arguments to persuade central actors.  
Both predetermined and tendered FiTs thus have advantages and disadvantages which make them 
more or less suitable dependent on country conditions. Table 2 attempts to give an overview of 
relevant questions to assist policy makers in making the choice between tendering or predetermining 
FiTs. This overview is, of course, not comprehensive and can only provide rough guidance on 




Table 2: Choice of FiT determination method according to country circumstances 
 
 Yes No 
Does the government have 
high technical management 
capabilities? 
predetermine / tender predetermine 
Does the government have 
high political management 
capabilities? 
predetermine / tender tender 
Is it imperative to minimise the 
cost to consumers? 
tender predetermine / tender 
Are technology costs likely to 
develop quickly? 
tender predetermine / tender 
Is planning certainty for 
project developers important, 
e.g. because technology or 
country risk is high? 
predetermine predetermine / tender 
Does the government want to 
achieve a specific rate of 
capacity addition, e.g. to reach 
RE targets? 
tender predetermine / tender 
Is there a high risk of 
adventurous bidding, e.g. 
because project developers 
lack experience or they want 
access to an attractive market? 
predetermine / tender, but 
include penalty payments in 
tender if projects fail to realise 
predetermine / tender 
Is there a low number of 
project developers? 
predetermine predetermine / tender 
Are inflation rates high? predetermine / tender, link FiT 
rate to inflation rate 
predetermine / tender, link FiT 
rate to inflation rate 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Like any other subsidy programme, well-designed FiTs require strong management capabilities in the 
responsible government entities. Technical management capabilities are required for both 
determination methods, but to varying degrees, with tenders being the more complex option. 
Predetermined FiTs are the more feasible option when technical management capacities within 
government do not suffice for managing a tender process. Governments can then consider engaging 
international consultants or acquiring expertise from international development cooperation. 
Political management capabilities are required to keep rent-seeking in check. Corruption and 
clientelism related issues are an issue for both instruments, but are probably most pronounced in the 
case of predetermined FiTs, which are more prone to lobbying than a competitive process and can 
lead to windfall profits. Tendered FiTs are thus more efficient and transparent when rent-seeking 
may lead to excessive FiT predetermination. 
Excessive FiTs go along with an unnecessarily high cost burden to consumers. The impacts of policies 
on poor consumers are of specific concern to policy makers in developing countries. Negative effects 
should be avoided, or affected groups of population should receive compensation. In the case of 
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increasing electricity prices caused by FiTs, the introduction of such mitigating measures as electricity 
lifeline tariffs can be an option. Competition through tenders can contribute to keeping the 
determination of FiT levels transparent and efficient, and minimise the added cost to consumers. 
They also ensure the flexibility of FiTs to react to technology cost developments. Project planning 
certainty, on the other hand, is generally higher with predetermined FiTs, so that risk premiums can 
be lower.  
When governments have set specific renewable energy targets, the rate of capacity addition induced 
by a policy is of interest. This is easier to steer with tenders, since by definition they predetermine 
the capacity to be added. Capacity additions under predetermined FiTs are more difficult to predict 
and depend on the level of FiTs.  
Adventurous bidding, that is, bids which are too low to be economically viable, has been an issue in 
some tendering schemes, notably in India (Altenburg et al. 2014). This risk can be curbed by penalty 
payments which are due in case the project does not materialize. 
If there are only few potential project developers they can coordinate more easily. Tendering may in 
this case not be the best option: markets often do not function when the number of actors is too 
small. On the other hand, smaller numbers of actors can also coordinate more easily to exert 
pressure on governments trying to predetermine FiT rates.  
High inflation rates complicate every policy that is based on changing the prices of goods or services. 
They tend to increase the risk to investors, but in the case of FiTs this risk can be mitigated by linking 
the FiT rates to inflation rates. 
The above given list of questions can assist policy makers in choosing a suitable FiT determination 
method by providing an overview of key issues to consider. However, it should not be seen as a 
comprehensive tool. While the determination of an efficient FiT rate can be considered a major 
renewable energy policy aim, other factors strongly influence policy effectiveness and the 
attractiveness of the policy scheme for renewable energy investors. Hille et al. (2013: 8) provide an 
insightful analysis of investor decision making factors, among them profits, country-specific risks and 
costs (e.g. political and regulatory stability, taxation, corruption levels and bureaucracy), full project 
costs (e.g. investment costs, consultancy, financing, operation and maintenance), modes of financing 
(e.g. power purchase agreements, subsidies, credit availability) and local project identification and 
development (e.g. language barriers, local labour rules, import restrictions). These factors strongly 
influence transaction costs and risk premiums for investors, and consequently impact on accepted 
FiT levels. In addition to choosing a FiT determination method which suits the governmental capacity 
and lowers the risk of windfall profits, governments should therefore strive to positively influence 
the other factors for decision making of investors. 
Correspondingly, policy makers consider efficiency as one factor in their decision for a particular 
renewable energy policy, but other aims can play a similarly important role. Particularly in developing 
countries, energy access and the development of local economic benefits come to mind. Renewable 
energies lend themselves to the electrification of remote rural areas, since their cost of installation is 
often lower than an extension of the national grid. Including such generation in a national feed-in 
tariff, however, would require reliable metering equipment and procedures and is likely to involve 
high verification costs. Other incentive schemes may therefore be more suitable to support rural 
electrification with renewables. In the case of local economic benefits, many countries have been 
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experimenting with local content requirements for the FiT eligibility of renewable energy projects. 
The success of such requirements, however, crucially depends on the technical capacities of 
domestic industries. Where capacities are low and no capacity building takes places, local content 
requirements simply shift economic rents from international to national manufacturers. They thus 
raise additional hurdles to project developers without catalysing technological upgrading (Altenburg 
et al. 2014). 
Lastly, a policy never stands in splendid isolation. Whichever combination and design of energy policy 
measures is chosen, it needs to be analysed for unintended interactions with other policies, and, if 
necessary, harmonised. One example is the parallel operation of a feed-in tariff for renewable 
energies and a cap and trade system for carbon emissions. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
any lowering of carbon emissions induced by a feed-in tariff would lead to the availability of 
additional certificates, which, once sold, would generate corresponding emissions elsewhere. On the 
other hand, the political decision of where exactly to fix a cap on emissions may itself be partly 
influenced by anticipating trends of future renewables capacity. In essence, the parallel operation of 
feed-in tariffs and emissions trading schemes will crowd out most of the former’s emission reduction 
benefits – not, however, the other benefits it creates, such as energy diversification, or gains in 
competitiveness and innovation. Similar (positive or negative) interactions may occur with other 
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